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Abstract 
The great majority of police officers is committed to honorable and competent public service 
and consistently demonstrates integrity and accountability in carrying out the often difficult, 
complex and sometimes dangerous, activities involved in policing by consent. However, in 
every police agency there exists an element of dishonesty, lack of professionalism and 
criminal behavior. This article is based on archival research of criminal behavior in the 
Norwegian police force. A total of 60 police employees were prosecuted in court because of 
misconduct and crime from 2005 to 2010. Court cases were coded as two potential predictors 
of court sentence in terms of imprisonment days, i.e. type of deviance and level of deviance. 
Categories of police crime and levels were organized according to a conceptual framework 
developed for assessing and managing police deviance (Dean, Bell and Lauchs, 2010). 
Empirical findings support the hypothesis that as the seriousness of police crime increases in 
breadth and depth so also does the severity of the court sentence as measured by time in 
prison.  
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Continuum of Police Crime: An 
Empirical Study of Court Cases 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Policing has at its heart the notion of ‘service’ to the community in which it operates, even if 
at times ‘force’ may be a legally allowed option to take to carry out such ‘service’.   It’s a 
difficult tightrope to walk for police (Alderson, 1975, 1979; Brodgen, 1981, 1982; Reiner, 
1985; Shapland and Vagg, 1988). Sometimes the idealism of joining the police to do 
something worthwhile for the community can become diluted by too many negative 
experiences with the public, too little job satisfaction, and too much bureaucracy.  Under such 
circumstances, idealism can be fatally ruptured and police deviance takes up residence in the 
space where idealism used to live. 
This article seeks to empirically apply a conceptual framework developed Dean, Bell and 
Lauchs (2010) for assessing and managing police deviance. The conceptual framework 
proposed by Dean et al. (2010) sought to address the lack of an adequately formulated 
framework in the literature to capture the breath and depth of police misconduct and crime 
and its complexity at various levels to do with, not only individual deviance, but also group 
and systemic deviance.     
Dean et al. (2010) adopted a Knowledge Management approach to develop a ‘sliding scale’ 
of police deviance that employs an matrix structure to show how police deviance increases in 
seriousness as its progresses along a continuum from misconduct to corruption to predatory 
policing.      
Hence, the purpose of this article is to explore the extent to which this conceptually-derived 
continuum of police crime is an empirically useful instrument for police oversight agencies to 
employ in their fight against police deviance. In order to examine this question in an 
empirical context a sample of Norwegian police officers charged with various types of police 
crime were used as the data set for this study.  Thus, this study involved a retrospective 
analysis of archival research of a sample of prosecuted police officers in the Norwegian 
Police Force over a five year period. From 2005 to 2010, a total of 60 police employees in 
Norway were prosecuted in court because of alleged criminal behavior.  Furthermore, in 
order to examine more precisely the ‘seriousness’ assumption underlying the continuum this 
study sought to test the hypothesis that ‘as the seriousness of police crime increases in 
breadth and depth so also should the severity of the court sentences  increase in terms of days 
in prison.’  
 
POLICE CRIME 
Police integrity and accountability has been a concern in most regions and countries, for 
example in Australia (OPI, 2007; Prenzler and Lewis, 2005) and in Norway, as presented in 
this article. According to the United Nations (UNODC, 2006), the great majority of 
individuals involved in policing are committed to honorable and competent public service 
and consistently demonstrate high standards of personal and procedural integrity in 
performing their duties. However, in every policing agency there probably exists an element 
of dishonesty, lack of professionalism and criminal behavior, in spite of the best practice 
training methods.     
The prevalence of police deviance is a much-debated statistic and one that is often rife with 
problems, according to Porter and Warrender (2009). Some researchers suggest corruption is 
endemic to police culture across the globe, others argue that incidents are rare. Despite such 
statistical problems, incidents of police deviance do surface from time to time all over the 
world. There are several clear examples in the UK and Australia in recent years that involve 
suppression of evidence, beating of suspects, tampering with confidential evidence and 
perjury (MacPherson, 1999; Yeadon, 2006).  
A prominent theory regarding police deviance is the notion of a ‘slippery slope’ (O’Connor, 
2005), in that, once a police officer engages in even relatively small and minor violations of 
departmental rules like accepting a free meal or discounts, then they have taken the first steps 
towards other more serious forms of misconduct, which can eventually lead them into a 
downward slide into major crime practices.  However, like most theoretical notions to do 
with policing the ‘slippery slope’ idea is contested by some researchers1.  What is of interest 
here is not the notion of a ‘slippery slope’ per se but rather how police deviance can be 
viewed as a continuum in terms of seriousness with low-level misconduct and unethical 
behaviours at one end with police brutality and corruption in the middle and finally serious 
predatory behaviours to do with avaricious greed, collusion, and criminal networking at the 
other end.2  How and by what path(s) deviant police officers end up involved in misconduct 
and/or corrupt practices via a slippery slope, or simply a character flaw or the corrupting 
influence of other police is beyond the scope of this paper.       
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
There are various classification schemes and theoretical notions in the literature and all have 
their merits and taken together create a mosaic of police deviance as perceived from different 
vantage points. The purpose of this paper is to empirically apply one such classification 
scheme proposed by Dean et al. (2010) which was developed as a conceptually relevant 
framework to appropriately capture from a knowledge management perspective the salient 
dimensions of police deviance in terms of its breadth and depth.  To achieve breadth and 
depth dimensions Dean et al (2010) employed a matrix-type structure for their 
conceptualization of police deviance.  A slightly modified version of their conceptual 
framework is presented below in Figure 1.    
                                                 
 
 
1 See Kleinig (1996) and Newburn (2005) for a fuller discussion of the relative utility of ‘slippery slope’ notion.  
2 For a detailed discussion of the conceptual framework under consideration, see Dean, G., Bell, P. and Lauchs, M. (2010). 
Conceptual framework for managing knowledge of police deviance, Policing & Society, 20 (2), 204-222.  
  
Police Corruption
Individual   
Organisation 
Predatory Policing
Key element is the misuse of 
police authority for gain (eg. 
taking bribes,  ‘fixing’ a criminal 
prosecution by leaving out 
relevant information, drug 
dealing, police abuse & brutality 
{aggressive stop & search, use of 
excessive force}, and so forth. 
Moreover, police corruption can 
also involve criminal collusion 
with organised crime and/or 
politicians. [Punch, 2003]
Police proactively engage in 
predatory behaviour (eg. extorting 
money from the public or from 
criminals by providing protection 
and other ‘services’ to them.  
[Gerber and Mendelson, 2008]      
‘rotten apple’ theory 
(individualistic model 
of human failure)
‘rotten orchards’ theory of systemic corruption 
(institutionalized model of systemic failure)
Police Misconduct
Violations of departmental rules, 
policies, procedures (eg. gratuity 
{free meals, discounts etc.}, 
improper/unethical use of police 
resources for personal use 
{favours for friends, relatives, 
etc.}, security breaches, obscene 
profane language, racial slurs and 
so forth.) [O’Connor, 2005]   
‘rotten barrel’ theory 
(occupational socialization model 
of police culture failure) 
Group  
Categories  
Levels   
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for a Continuum of Police Crime 
 
As can be seen the ‘depth’ dimension of police deviance involves three levels – that of, the 
individual, the group, and the organization respectively. Furthermore, as is evident on figure 
1 each level can be ‘metaphorically’ related through extension of the ‘rotten apple’ theory of 
police deviance, which is a favoured analogy used by police and academics.  Punch 
(2003:172) makes the point that “The police themselves often employ the 'rotten apple' 
metaphor – the deviant cop who slips into bad ways and contaminates the other essentially 
good officers – which is an individualistic, human failure model of deviance.”  One 
explanation for favoring this individualistic model of police deviance is provided by 
O’Connor (2005:2) when he states, “Police departments tend to use the rotten apple theory… 
to minimize the public backlash against policing after every exposed act of corruption.”  
Hence, it follows according to this individualistic view of police criminality that anti-
corruption strategies should be targeted at finding the 'rotten apples' through measures like 
'integrity testing' (Commission on Police Integrity, 1999), and putting policies and procedures 
in place reduce the opportunity for engaging in misconduct and/or corrupt practices.  
However, in regard to the 'rotten apple' thesis this level of explanation for police deviance is 
as Perry (2001: 1) notes “…most major inquiries into police corruption reject the 'bad-apple' 
theory: 'the rotten-apple theory won’t work any longer. Corrupt police officers are not 
natural-born criminals, nor morally wicked men, constitutionally different from their honest 
colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples, the 
organization, not just the individual in it, because corrupt police are made, not born.' ”  
Therefore, Dean et al’s conceptual framework has extended the 'rotten apple' metaphor to 
include the group level view of police cultural deviance with a ‘rotten barrel’ metaphor 
(O’Connor, 2005). Furthermore, Punch (2003) has pushed the notion of 'rotten orchards' to 
highlight police deviance at the systemic level. Punch (2003:172) notes, "the metaphor of 
'rotten orchards' indicate(s) that it is sometimes not the apple, or even the barrel, that is rotten 
but the system (or significant parts of the system)". That is, deviance that has become 
systemic is: 
… in some way encouraged, and perhaps even protected, by certain elements in the system. 
…. “Systems” refers both to the formal system – the police organization, the criminal justice 
system and the broader socio-political context – and to the informal system of deals, 
inducements, collusion and understandings among deviant officers as to how the corruption is 
to be organized, conducted and rationalized.” (Punch, 2003:172). 
These metaphorical extensions represent increasing deeper-level meanings associated with 
police crime and by implication suggest degrees of seriousness for individuals engaging in 
criminal behaviour either alone or in concert with a group and/or at the systemic level of a 
police organization.            
 
CONTEXT OF RESEARCH  
The Norwegian Bureau prosecutes police officers in court. The Norwegian Bureau is similar 
to police oversight agencies found in other countries, such as the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission in the UK, the Crime and Misconduct Commission in the State of 
Queensland and other similar bodies in other States of  Australia, the Police Department for 
Internal Investigations in Germany, the Inspectorate General of the Internal Administration in 
Portugal, the Standing Police Monitoring Committee in Belgium, the Garda Siochána 
Ombudsman Commission in Ireland, Federal Bureau for Internal Affairs in Austria, and the 
Ministry of the Interior, Police and Security Directorate in Slovenia. 
Since 1988, Norway has a separate system to handle allegations against police officers for 
misconduct. The system was frequently accused of not being independent of regular police 
organizations (Thomassen, 2002). In 2003, the Norwegian Parliament decided to establish a 
separate body to investigate and prosecute cases where employees in the police service or the 
prosecuting authority are suspected of having committed criminal acts in the police service. 
The Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs has been effective since 
January 2005. The Bureau is mandated to investigate and prosecute cases where employees in 
the police service or the prosecuting authority are accused of having committed criminal acts 
in the service. The Norwegian Bureau has both investigating and prosecuting powers and in 
that way it differs from some comparable European bodies. The Norwegian Bureau does not 
handle complaints from the public concerning allegations of rude or bad behavior that does 
not amount to a criminal offence (Presthus, 2009). 
Since the operations started at the Norwegian Bureau in January 2005 and until February 
2010, a total of 60 police officers were on trial in Norwegian courts. This was the sample for 
our study. There were 3 prosecuted officers in 2005, 14 in 2006, 16 in 2007, 20 in 2008, and 
5 in 2009, and 2 so far in 2010. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Archival research of court decisions is predominately qualitative. This study involved the 
analysis of various types of court documentation relating to the sample of 60 prosecuted 
police officers who went on trial in Norway from 2005 to 2010.  
Court transcripts were obtained from the Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police 
Affairs, which has an archive of all court rulings in electronic format. A court transcript 
ranges from two to twenty pages of text where the act is explained and legal issues are 
discussed. The act is best explained in rulings from district courts. When cases are appealed 
to courts of appeal or even to Supreme Court, then court transcripts are more about law and 
less about actions carried out. Therefore, transcripts from district courts were the most useful 
ones sought for analysis, while transcripts from higher courts were needed to find the final 
court sentence in terms of prison days if they were appealed.  
The unit of analysis applied in this study is the individual prosecuted, rather than the court 
case. This is because an organization is never prosecuted in a criminal court for jail sentence.  
However, an individual police officer may appeal his or her case to a higher court. Therefore, 
there were more court cases than individuals on trial. There were a total of 80 court cases for 
the 60 prosecuted individuals.  
Whilst, individuals are the unit of analysis since they are the ones prosecuted for police crime 
not groups or organizations per se, this does not discount the reality that misconduct and 
corruption occurs in work teams, groups and indeed can lead to systemic or organizational 
pockets of police crime where solidarity and the code of silence is the glue that holds such 
individuals together to commit various types of police crime (Perry, 2001; Punch, 2003).  
Indeed, one of the significant features of the Dean et al. (2010) framework under examination 
in this article is the conceptual richness of the police crime continuum in terms of its depth 
that goes beyond just an individualistic understanding of police crime to incorporate group 
and organizational level concepts and explanations of potential criminal behaviour by police 
officers as shown in Figure 1.         
 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF CATEGORIES   
In order to retrospectively apply the ‘police crime’ continuum to the above sample of 
prosecuted Norwegian police officers it was first necessary to operationalize the breath and 
depth of ‘police crime’ in terms of seriousness and complexity as displayed on the continuum 
in Figure 1 into meaningful categories.  As can be seen from Figure 1 this continuum forms a 
matrix-type framework whereby a 3 X 3 cell structure is derived. This Matrix cell framework 
is shown in figure 2 below.  It includes a label in each cell that defines the appropriate 
‘motive’ for the category of police crime involved.   
Police misconduct Police corruption Predatory policing
Individual
‘human failure’
(rotten apple)
Organisation
‘systemic failure’
of integrity systems  
(rotten orchard)
Group
‘socialisation failure‘
within police culture
(rotten barrel)
Violation of rules, 
policies, procedures
Misuse of police authority 
for personal satisfaction/gain
Proactively engage in 
predatory behaviours
1
Overzealous
2
Misguided
4
Opportunism 
7
Greed
5
Condoning
9
Connected
8
Collusion
6
Obstructionism
3
Unethical
 
Figure 2: Matrix 3x 3 cell structure of categories and levels for police crime 
 
As is evident, there are, theoretically, nine ‘motives’ for engaging in police deviance 
represented in this matrix structure. These motives stretch across the three top-level 
categories of misconduct, corruption and predatory policing and down through the level of 
the deviant individual (rotten apple), or to a group of corrupt officers (rotten barrel) and may 
at times systemically effect parts of the police organisation (rotten orchard) as a whole.    
As can be seen, each of the ‘numbered cells’ is labeled by a descriptive word that best 
encapsulates the nature and essence of the presumed ‘motive’ that drives the type of police 
crime represented in each cell. Such categorical labels are relatively common terminology in 
policing circles when there is talk about ‘why’ fellow officers engage in misconduct and/or 
corrupt practices.  Furthermore, the literature on corruption research also alludes to similar 
motivational drivers behind police deviance.  Hence, the nine ‘motives’ as shown on Figure 2 
were conceptually derived from police experience and the extant literature and represent an 
distilled refinement of the complexities inherent in policing police deviance.  
To ensure consistent and reliable coding of the court documents for the sample of 60 police 
officers studied, each of the nine ‘motive’ cells were operationalised by the researchers with 
descriptive statements into a coding sheet as illustrated below in Figure 3: 
‘Police Misconduct’ Categories
1. ‘Overzealous’ motive - involves an individual who projects a ‘police persona’ as a tough, no-nonsense, hard talking, image of efficiency which at 
times can spill over into behaviours which violate established rules, policies and/or procedures for lawful policing and hence lead to police misconduct.
2. ‘Misguided’ motive - involves an individual who has acquired through inappropriate socialization within the police culture a set of unprofessional 
ideas about police work like being cynical, mistrusting, and having out-of-sync priorities with the mission of policing which leads them to ignore and/or 
disobey what they see as ‘hindering’ rules, policies and procedures. 
3. ‘Unethical’ motive - involves an individual who feels secure and/or protected enough in their role of a police officer within the organization to 
‘knowingly’ violate established ethical standards and/or engage in illegal risk-taking behaviours to achieve their goals.       
‘Police Corruption’ Categories
4. ‘Opportunism’ motive - involves an individual who has developed an ‘us and them’ mentality towards the public and cynicism about the value of 
the job which is manifested in a desire to look after one’s self by taking opportunities, as they present themselves, to misuse police powers for personal 
satisfaction.
5. ‘Condoning’ motive - involves an individual who either by commission ‘knowingly’ engages in the misuse of police power or by omission ‘turn a 
blind eye’ to other police who engage in the misuse police authority because of the unwritten ‘code of silence’ that implicitly guarantees protection for 
deviant police by relying on other officers to join in and/or, at least, keep quiet about incidents of corrupt practices.
6 ‘Obstructionism’ motive - involves an individual who not only indirectly ‘condones’ at a group level unethical and/or corrupt practices but who also 
‘actively’ obstructs such practices coming to light by cover them up through omission (i.e. police don’t prosecute police) or commission (i.e. failure to 
investigative incidents properly by internal audits/ethical standards unit, etc.) and as such represent integrity failures within the organization.
‘Predatory Policing’ Categories
7. ‘Greed’ motive - involves an individual who has perverted the role of policing as upholders of the law and justice to one of self-seeking exploitation 
of opportunities to prey on others for financial and personal gain.
8. ‘Collusion’ motive - involves an individual who colludes with others by    banding together to maximize benefits through exploiting opportunities for 
profit.
9. ‘Connected’ motive - involves an individual who ‘actively networks’ within policing and/or outside the organization to forge links with the criminal 
underworld in order to maximize profit-sharing through exploitation on others. 
Figure 3: Coding Sheet for Analysis of Court Cases Documentation 
The operationalization into police crime categories of the court documents was performed by 
all three researchers independently in a two-stage process. All researchers have extensive 
experience and knowledge of police misconduct and crime.  Initially, a ‘blind’ coding 
exercise was undertaken by two of the researchers. The researchers have access to the 
complete case files of more than three hundred pages. Both researchers classified 
independently each case according to the seriousness scale (misconduct, corruption, 
predatory) and the level scale (individual, group, organization). Because of the qualitative 
nature of the analysis it was deemed appropriate to engage in a second stage of ‘inter-rater 
comparison’ by the third researcher in order to clarify and refine where necessary any areas 
of uncertainty in relation to the appropriateness of cases being assigned to a particular 
category rather than opting for an ‘interrater reliability’ score. By this process of ‘iterative 
analysis’ mutual agreement was arrived at for all case data coding into the various police 
crime categories by all three researchers.   
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The demographic case data drawn from court documents for the sample studied is listed in 
Table 1 below.  
Court 
Outcome 
Year Descriptive Example for each prosecuted police employee 
case for years 2005 to 2010 in Norway (60 cases in total) 
Age Cell 
Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) 
No jail 
sentence 
(19 cases) 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2005 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Killing of dogs without permission 
Killing of dogs without permission 
Dangerous driving of unmarked police car   
Dangerous driving of police car 
Dangerous driving of police boat 
Dangerous driving of private car on duty 
Excessive use of force in refugee institution 
Daughter age 13 put in handcuffs at house search warrant 
Dangerous driving while chasing motorcycle 
Excessive violence during arrest 
Excessive violence during arrest  
Excessive violence during arrest  
Excessive violence during arrest 
Excessive violence during arrest 
Derogatory, racist remarks to colored inmate 
Sexual contact with woman who had filed crime case 
Changing urine test result for drug addict 
Permission to wife's sister based on false data 
Leaking confidential information to outsider 
44 
40 
46 
32 
56 
32 
53 
36 
47 
27 
28 
30 
34 
35 
37 
46 
30 
50 
40 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
 
 
 
 
(B) 
Less than  
2 weeks 
(13 cases) 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
2008 
2010 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Dangerous driving of police car - person injured 
Dangerous driving of private car - person injured 
Dangerous driving of police car - serious car damage 
Dangerous driving of police car - without reason 
Dangerous driving of private car - passing on right hand side 
Physical injury caused when confiscating mobile phone 
Dangerous driving of police car - person injured 
Dangerous driving of police car - person injured  
Leaking confidential information to his father 
Leaking confidential information to relative 
Leaking confidential information to criminal 
Leaking confidential information from system 
Doing private marketing business while on police duty 
29 
61 
25 
38 
35 
37 
39 
33 
39 
64 
47 
26 
55 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
4 
7 
7 
7 
 
 
 
2006 
2008 
2008 
Driving police car while intoxicated 
Driving unmarked police car while intoxicated 
Driving private car while intoxicated 
57 
55 
56 
3 
3 
3 
 
(C) 
Less than  
2 months 
(15 cases) 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2007 
2008 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Document forgery of exam from Police Academy 
Document forgery of medical statement 
Sexual approach without consent 
Changed address of personal enemy in computer system 
Threat of revenge towards police colleague 
Sending sexual messages to woman using mobile phone 
Theft from crime scene and police station 
Theft of rifle handed in to police station 
Leaking information about planned police actions 
Leaking confidential information to criminals 
Leaking information about informant to criminals 
Leaking confidential list to TV journalist 
25 
31 
46 
28 
43 
37 
31 
51 
26 
35 
19 
55 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
 
 
(D) 
Less than  
2 years 
(9 cases) 
2006 
2006 
2005 
2007 
2007 
2009 
2010 
2009 
2009 
Manipulated speed control result for colleague 
Manipulated speed control result for colleague 
Stealing from colleagues and office at the police station 
Stealing from colleagues and office at police station 
Stealing money from fine payments 
Stealing confiscated drugs at police station 
Stealing money from police accounts 
Paid by prison inmate to arrange frequent home trips 
Leaking information about investigations to TV journalist 
36 
32 
36 
42 
34 
41 
37 
54 
56 
5 
5 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
(E) 
More than  
2 years 
(4 cases) 
2006 
2007 
2010 
2009 
Theft of money confiscated for illegal gambling 
Theft of drugs for personal consumption 
Sexual harassment and rape of many intoxicated women 
Paid by prison inmate to arrange frequent home trips 
51 
46 
51 
59 
7 
7 
7 
8 
 
Table 1: Case Data for Court Outcome in relation to length of Jail Sentence     
As can be seen on Table 1 the demographic case data covers the court outcome, year, age, as 
well as providing descriptive examples of the type of criminal offence committed for all of 
the 60 court cases.  Moreover, the cases are grouped according to severity in terms of the 
length of the jail sentence given as shown where (A) no jail sentence (19 police officers), (B) 
less than two weeks (13 police officers), (C) less than two months (15 police officers), (D) 
less than two years (9 police officers), and (E) more than two years of imprisonment (4 police 
officers).   
In regard to court outcome (A) 19 out of the 60 prosecuted police officers received no jail 
sentence. This finding implies these officers’ court cases were dismissed with or without a 
fine.  The reasons for dismissal varied from not enough evidence to convict to the standard of 
proof required for a criminal offence through to the reliability of the evidence.  Given the 
type of archival material available it was not possible to identify with precision the exact 
reasons for dismissal of these non-imprisonment cases. In relation to days of imprisonment, 
the average sentence was 99 days in jail and the standard deviation was 269 days (Hair et al., 
2010). The longest jail sentence was 1642 days.  
The final column on Table 1 is the inter-rated ‘cell code’ category assigned to each case by 
the researchers.  When these ‘cell’ code categories of police crime are cross-tabulated with 
the length of jail sentences the following Table is obtained.     
 
Police Crime 
‘Cell Code’ 
Categories 
 
Length of Jail Sentence 
 
 
 
Totals 
No Jail 
Sentence 
Less 
than  
2 weeks 
Less 
than  
2 mths 
Less 
than  
2 years 
More 
than  
2 years 
Misconduct  
(ind level)-cell 1: 
Overzealous 
 9 cases 8 cases    
 
17 
 
 
 
 
26 
(gr level)-cell 2: 
Misguided 
 
5 cases      
 
5 
(org level)-cell 3: 
Unethical 
 
1 case  3 cases   
 
4 
Corruption  
(ind level)-cell 4: 
Opportunism 
4 cases  2 cases 6 cases   
 
12 
 
 
 
 
14 
(gr level)-cell 5: 
Condoning 
 
   2 cases  
 
2 
(org level)-cell 6: 
Obstructionism 
 
     
 
0 
Predatory 
(ind level)-cell 7: 
Greed 
  3 cases 2 cases 5 cases 3 cases 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
20 
(gr level)-cell 8: 
Collusion 
 
  4 cases  2 cases 1 case 
 
7 
(org level)-cell 9: 
Connected 
 
     
 
0 
 
Totals 
 
 
19  
 
13  15  
 
9  
 
4  
 
60 
 
Table 2: Cross-Tabulation of Police Crime Categories by the Length of Jail Sentence 
As can be seen on Table 2, the majority of cases involved the police misconduct category (26 
cases) across all levels (individual, group and organisation) with ‘overzealous’ policing by 
individual officers being the most prevalent category (17 out of 26 cases). Most of these cases 
of ‘overzealous’ policing involved officers committing various forms of dangerous driving 
offences as is evident from Table 1 in the descriptive examples column.  The 5 cases of 
‘misguided’ policing while committed by individuals occurred in a group context and 
involved the use of excessive violence to affect an arrest.  The court documentation on these 
group-level cases of police misconduct makes it clear that the arresting officer used excessive 
force in concert with others who were present and they did nothing to restrain the offending 
officer from using excessive violence. As for the 4 cases of organisational-level ‘unethical’ 
policing it is clear from the examples given (Figure 1) that 3 out of the 4 cases involved drink 
driving offences and as such each attracted a court sentence of around 2 months in prison.  
These cases were coded as organisational-level examples of ‘unethical’ policing because 
these officers ‘knowingly’ violated a ‘don’t drink and drive’ organisational rule where there 
are no grounds for classifying their behaviour as being either overzealous or misguided in its 
intentions.  Therefore, the findings for this police misconduct category, in general it is clear 
that as the seriousness of the misconduct deepens from overzealousness to misguided to 
unethical behaviours so does the court sentence generally increase in seriousness with respect 
to the more serious forms of misconduct attracting longer jail sentences.                           
In relation to the police corruption category, there were 14 cases overall, with the majority 
(12 cases) involving ‘opportunistic’ individuals taking advantage of their position as a police 
officer to leak confidential information to relatives and friends, or trying to gain sexual 
favours, and in 2 cases forge documents (see Table 1).  At the group level, there were 2 cases 
that involved ‘condoning’ the corrupt practice of manipulating speed camera results for 
police colleagues.  The seriousness of such ‘condoning’ corruption is evident by the court 
sentence of up to 2 years in prison for each case.  There were no organisational-level 
‘obstructive’ cases of policing found in the sample.  Hence, with regard to the police 
corruption category, the findings again show the same general pattern as for the misconduct 
category in that as the seriousness of corruption deepens from individuals acting alone to 
group involvement so does the court sentence seriously increase in terms of longer prison 
time.   
With regard to the predatory policing category, there were 20 cases in all and this represents 
the second largest police crime category for this sample of 60 police officers in relation to the 
previous two categories (misconduct – 26 cases, and corruption – 14 cases respectively).  As 
to be expected with this type of predatory police crime ‘greed’ was the predominate motive 
(13 out of 20 cases). However, interestingly at the group-level of predatory policing there 
were 7 cases of criminal collusion that involved leaking of confidential information about 
police operations to criminals and the media and in one case passing on information about an 
informant to criminals. Clearly, such serious predatory behaviours attracted the most severe 
jail sentences by the courts (Table 2).  As for organisational-level predatory policing there 
were no recorded cases of criminal ‘connectedness’ to the underworld in the sample studied. 
Thus, the findings for this predatory policing category follow a similar pattern as the other 
two police crime categories (misconduct and corruption) in that as the seriousness of 
predatory policing crimes deepen so also does the length of imprisonment increase.       
In sum, what these cross-tabulated findings clearly indicate for the sample of 60 prosecuted 
police officers studied is that as the severity of the sentence increases in terms of days in 
prison so does the seriousness of the police crime categories increase as they fan out with 
regard to their breadth and depth.    
 
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The obvious limitation of this study is that the sample size of 60 cases is too small to use 
parametric tests of significance and hence draw statistically significant findings. Moreover, 
the sample size is in fact the entire population of prosecuted police officers for this relatively 
new police oversight agency that has only been established in 2005. Also, given the 
exploratory nature of the study and the fact that the main source of data is court documents 
then a qualitative methodology was mandated.  Nonetheless, future research with a larger 
sample size is needed to test the validity of this continuum and its matrix framework 
comprehensively.              
 
DISCUSSION 
The underlying ‘scale of seriousness’ of the continuum implies a movement from one 
category to another in a fanning out type of manner in terms of breath and depth dimensions. 
This in turn lead to the theoretical development of at least nine categories of potential police 
crime being exposed for investigation by internal police ethical standards units and by 
external police oversight and watchdog agencies. In other words, as the nature of the 
motivation gets progressively more serious or worse it both deepens and spreads across the 
various types of police crime from left to right on the continuum (Figure 2). The key point 
here is the progressive nature of how serious each category and level of police crime can 
become over time if left unchecked.  Hence, there is a level of complexity to police deviance 
that is inherent in the matrix cell framework of Figure 2.  A glimpse of such complexity is 
evident in the cross-tabulation findings for Table 2. For instance, this complexity is expressed 
at the level of group dynamics where the literature clearly indicates that individuals can 
become ‘misguided’ (cell 2) through exposure to corrupting influences of others where 
negative socialization practices of the police culture operate in work teams.  Under such 
‘police culture’ socialization failure individuals are more prone to succumb to misconduct 
when aided and abetted by a group context.  Once started on the misconduct road it is a small 
step to more serious forms of corruption supported by group solidarity that ‘condones’ (cell 
5) or, at the very least tolerates such deviance, and by extension into possible further 
predatory policing behaviors through greed (cell 7) individually or groups as in ‘collusion’ 
(cell 8) with other corrupt police or even in ‘connected’ (cell 9) coalition with criminals.  
Furthermore, at the organization level, there is ample evidence in the extant literature to 
indicate when an officer behaves ‘unethically’ (cell 3) other police often tolerate and hence 
indirectly ‘condone’ (cell 5) such deviant behaviour because of the code of silence in the 
police culture. This can lead to ‘obstructive’ (cell 6) and non-cooperative behaviors in the 
group towards organizational attempts to look into, via internal or external investigations, 
allegations and rumors of misdemeanors or corrupt practices.    
Whilst no such cases of ‘organisational-level’ other than ‘unethical’ (cell 3) behaviours of 
individual police officers were found in the Norway sample used to compare the empirical 
usefulness of this matrix framework, it is nonetheless a strong ‘theoretically’ possibility in so 
far at the wider corruption literature contains instances of criminal ‘obstruction’ (cell 6) and 
criminal ‘connectedness’ (cell 9) by pockets of police in organisational units (Fitzgerald, 
1989); Wood, 1997).        
The implication for police oversight agencies is one of getting wiser and smarter in finding 
ways to deal with detecting the complexities of police crime in order to successfully 
prosecute such criminal elements with policing organisations.   Clearly,   much more in the 
way of systems-wide integrity testing is required to deal with the most serious forms of 
‘organisational’ deviance.       
In summary, the findings in general provide empirical support for the aim of this study to 
explore the extent to which this conceptually-derived continuum of police crime is an 
empirically useful instrument for police oversight agencies.  The study did this by testing the 
hypothesis that as the seriousness of police crime increases so does the severity of court 
sentences as measured by imprisonment time.  In other words, the conceptually-derived 
continuum by Dean et al, (2010) and its theoretical development for this study into a matrix 
framework is consistent with how Courts, at least in Norway, appear to actually apply an 
implicit ‘seriousness’ scale in terms of the severity of the sentence given to deviant police 
officers.  Hence, this matrix framework used to operationalise the nine categories of this 
police crime continuum has relevance not only for use by police oversight agencies but also 
by Courts as a sentencing guide.         
 
CONCLUSION 
This study sought to address a research question about the empirically usefulness of the 
police crime continuum devised by Dean et al (2010) for police oversight/watchdog agencies.  
This study undertook a retrospective analysis of court documents of police officers convicted 
in Norway for a range of criminal behaviours and then comparing the seriousness of the 
conviction in terms of length of jail sentence with the conceptual-derived categories drawn 
from the extant literature as represented in a 3x 3 matrix cell framework.   The significance of 
this archival research is that while the findings provide support for the rotten-apple thesis of 
police crime it also pushes the boundary beyond this simplistic view of ‘individual’ police 
deviance to expose the more serious nature of group level police deviance. Empirical data of 
the severity of prison sentences delivered by Norwegian courts affirms the utility of the 
underlying seriousness scale of this police crime continuum and attests to the complexity of 
the nature of criminal police deviance and watchdog attempts to expose and root the most 
serious forms of organisational-level police crime.          
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